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A View of the Dutch IPO Cathedral
PETER B. OH*
Initial public offerings ("IPOs') are an exercise in
asymmetrical valuation. One mechanism for bridging these
asymmetries is a private financial intermediary to conduct
price discovery by meeting with preferred investors. An
alternate mechanism is an auction, such as a descending-bid
or Dutch procedure, to conduct price discovery by soliciting
bids from all prospective investors. Recent disenchantment
with the relationshipbetween issuers and intermediarieshas
prompted some to hail (online) auction-based IPOs. This
switch, however, incurs a variety of legal costs that may
justify broader mandatory disclosure and state intervention.
The legal costs of auction-basedIPOs can be gleanedfrom
examining various international regulatory regimes. To
comparatively evaluate these regimes, this article introduces
a paradigmaticframework derivedfrom the classic tri-tiered
schema that Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed
formulatedfor legal entitlements. By conceptualizing IPOs
as a problem of asymmetrically-valued shares, different
kinds of regulations can assume the form of property,
liability, and inalienability rules. The distinctions between
these rules explain variations within the regulatory schemes
of France, Israel, and Taiwan, the last bastions of auctionbased IPOs, and evince the legalprice that must be paidfor
the United States to offer an auction-based alternative to
bookbuilding.

I. INTRODUCTION
Going public is an exercise in asymmetrical valuation. To raise
equity successfully, a firm must calibrate its offering price and size. This
calibration is a function of market demand, which reflects prospective
investors' appraisals of the firm, its industry, and the general climate.
Information exchanges between a firm and its prospective investors,
however, are obstructed because these appraisals are realized through
. Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.A. 1994, Yale
College; J.D. 1997, The University of Chicago. E-mail: poh@pitt.edu. I thank Russell
L. Christopher, Jim Rossi, and Mark B. Seidenfeld for their suggestions, as well as
participants from the Symposium, "IPOs and the Internet Age: The Case for Updated
Regulations," for which this is the Keynote Address.
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aftermarket transactions; the less accurately a firm gauges market demand,
the more an investor stands to gain by selling its holdings.
One way to bridge these asymmetries is via an auction.1
Prospective investors submit bids for their preferred price and quantity of
shares. These bids permit the issuer to determine the lowest, or clearing,
price that results in a fully-subscribed offering.3 If demand matches supply,
everyone who submitted bids above the clearing price will receive shares; if
demand exceeds supply, all qualifying bids receive shares on a pro rata
basis.
Classically defined, an auction is "a market institution with an explicit set of rules
determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market
participants." R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON.
LIT. 699, 701 (1987); see also R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Bidding Rings, 82
AM. ECON. REV. 579, 581 (1992) ("The distinctive feature of an auction is asymmetric
information; if the seller knew the bidders' demands, he would simply post a price.").
For an extended period of time auctions were not regarded as an allocative mechanism
because they "committed the cardinal sin in economics of not being theoretically
convenient to study in terms of the traditional neoclassical theory." Andrew Schotter,
Auctions and Economic Theory, in BIDDING AND AUCTIONING FOR PROCUREMENT AND

ALLOCATION 3, 4 (Yakov Amihud ed. 1976). Schotter believes this is attributable to
auctions being "exchange mechanisms without a tatonnement or recontracting provision
in which the seller is relatively passive and goods are often indivisible." 1d; see also
generally LEON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (William Jaffe, trans., 1954)
(seminally analyzing tdtonnement).
2 The auction can, but need not, be conducted online. The first online (direct) public
offering in the United States was conducted in 1996. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom,
Jr., Going Public Through an Internet Direct Public Offering: A Sensible Alternative
for Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 531-32 (2001) (describing internet DPO of
Spring Street Brewing Company). See also infra notes 112-113 and accompanying
text. And the first online Dutch IPO in the United States was conducted in 1999. See
W.R.
Hambrecht
+
Co.,
OpeniPO:
Completed
Auctions,
http://ww.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/completed.html (last visited July 1, 2007).
Issuers, however, have been conducting Dutch IPOs internationally for over four
decades. See, e.g., John G. McDonald & Bertrand C. Jacquillat, Pricing of Initial
Equity Issues: The French Sealed-Bid Auction, 47 J. Bus. 37, 37 (1974) ("In France all
initial issues of common stock since 1964 have been priced and allocated in a sealedbid auction procedure ....
"). See also infra Part II.B-C.
3 See, e.g., Lucas C. Townsend, Comment, Can Wall Street's "Global Revolution"
Prevent Spinning? A Critical Evaluation of Current Alternatives, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1121, 1163-64 (2004) ("[T]he bid that depletes the shares in the offering . ..
determines the 'clearing price,' which is the price that the accepted bidders will pay for
their shares."). When the offering fails to be fully-subscribed, the clearing price should
be the lowest price within a range pre-announced by the issuer, but can be-and often
is a matter of discretion. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
4 See generally W.R. Hambrecht + Co., OpenIPO: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/faq.html (last visited July 1, 2007)
(describing W.R. Hambrecht + Co.'s Dutch IPO platform, known as OpenIPO, as being
"[b]ased on an auction system designed by Nobel Prize-winning economist William
Vickrey"). OpenIPO is the only auction-based platform available to U.S.-based IPOs.
See, e.g., Christine Hurt, What Google Can't Tell Us About Internet Auctions (And
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This procedure, known as a Dutch IPO, 5 presents theoretical
advantages over bookbuilding, another method for bridging asymmetrical
valuations in public offerings.6 Dutch iPOs promise to wean, if not
eliminate, the need for private financial intermediaries to conduct price
discovery and build books of orders through meetings with prominent
prospective investors. As a result, issuers are spared intermediary fees
while the equity pool is expanded to include anyone willing to submit a
bid.8 Moreover, as the auction purports to measure actual demand, the
offering price should reflect accurately the stock's market value; 9 this
enables the issuer to avoid an appreciable increase, or "pop," in price during
the first-day of trading, and thus, raise equity efficiently.
Dutch iPOs, however, also present unique problems.
The
procedure can be manipulated by submitting bids for a reduced number of
shares, 10 and can be circumvented by exchanging bid information or
What It Can), 37 TOLEDO L. REV. 403, 412 (2006) ("[O]f the firms that developed
online auction systems during the 1999-2000 Boom, only W.R. Hambrecht + Co.
currently maintains an online IPO platform.").
5 The name derives from the use of a descending-bid, or Dutch, auction to conduct price
discovery and share allocation, which earned its name through the flower markets in
Holland. See, e.g., Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J.
ECON. SURVEYS 227, 266 n.13 (1999). Unlike the English or Japanese auctions, the
price in a Dutch auction (and its international variants) descends successively until a
winner is declared. See id. at 267 (delineating the cosmopolitan array of auction types,
all of which are equally optimal selling mechanisms pursuant to the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem).
6 See generally Katrina Ellis et al., A Guide to the Initial Public Offering Process,
3
CORP. FIN. REV. 14 (1999).
7 See, e.g., William R. Hambrecht, Request for Comment on the Proposed
Rule
Governing Allocations and Distributions of Shares in Initial Public Offerings,
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/strategy/billpov/200401/wrhco20040107.pdf 6 (Jan.
7, 2004) (touting the Dutch IPO as a method that "replac[es] arbitrary pricing and
preferential allocation [by bookbuilding] with a system that objectively establishes the
full demand curve for an IPO and allocates to those investors willing to pay the highest
price"). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet
on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW. 1195, 1200 (1997) (terming the
"relative disappearance, or at least downsizing, of traditional financial intermediaries"
as "disintermediation"); Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the
Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755 (1985) (noting that
"computers would readily permit investors to bypass broker-dealers," but identifying
certain significant policy consequences).
8 Bids frequently are, but need not be, submitted online. Cf Securities Offering Reform,
70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,783 (2005) (promulgating an "access equals delivery" model in
which "investors are presumed to have access to the Internet").
9 In this respect, a pure Dutch IPO may be viewed as an analogue to the strong-form of
the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis. Cf West v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 282
F.3d 935, 938(1988) (Easterbrook, J.) ("No one these days accepts the strongest version
of the efficient capital markets hypothesis...").
10See generally Mira Ganor, A Proposalto Restrict Aanipulative Strategy in Auction
1POs (July 2004) (delineating reduced allocation strategy for manipulating Dutch
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forming a collusive bidding ring."
Moreover, these strategies can be
employed not only by prospective investors, but issuers. As a result, Dutch
IPOs may stimulate countervailing valuations and thereby exacerbate
asymmetries.
These asymmetries can be redressed in a myriad of ways. In the
United States, select bidding data are withheld and suspect bids can be
rejected by an issuer or an intermediary on a discretionary basis. 2 In
France and Israel, the collection, monitoring, and processing of bids are
charged to a central quasi-public authority that may publish bidding data.13
In Taiwan, these tasks are handled by a central governmental agency as
well as supplemented with various eligibility and allocation restrictions. 14
Each type of counter-measure to fraud or manipulation reflects
different portfolios of common considerations. The American approach
minimizes regulatory involvement in apparent favor of private dispute
resolution; 5 this coheres with a domestic emphasis on the Dutch IPO's
purported ability to mitigate, if not eliminate, underpricing.1 6 The French
and Israeli approaches feature intermediate regulatory involvement in
apparent favor of consistency and transparency;' this coheres with those
countries' emphasis on the Dutch IPO's purported ability to provide
egalitarian access to all institutional and retail investors.18 The Taiwanese
IPOs), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-52243. See also Peter B. Oh, The Dutch
Auction Ayth, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 853, 899-901 (2007) (critically examining
Ganor's proposal and delineating bidding ring strategy).
See Oh, supra note 10, at 901-09.
2 See infra Part II.A.
13See infra Part II.B.

14See infra Part II.C.
15 See infra Part II.A.

16See, e.g., Shane Kite, Google Goes Dutch, Rocking 1PO Sector, 17 BANK TECH.
NEWS 27, 27 (Aug. 2004) ("Dutch auctions, say supporters, offer a truer price based on
more accurate demand of a wider market, because the issuance is open to any potential
shareholder with an Internet connection, instead of select institutional accounts favored
by individual underwriters."). See also Google, Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1
Registration Statement 31 (filed with SEC on Aug. 18, 2004) (justifying decision to go
public with an auction-based IPO because it would generate "a share price that reflects
an efficient market valuation of Google") (Letter from the Founders: "An Owner's
Manual" for Google's Shareholders) [hereinafter Google, Amended Form S-I],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504142742/ds I a.htm.
1 See infra Part II.B.
18See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., 1PO Underpricingand Dutch Auctions, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
16, 1999, at 5; (arguing that "individual investors should prefer Dutch Auctions, and a
significant 'democratization' of the IPO process can be envisioned"); William
Hambrecht,
Fixing
the
1PO
Process,
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/strategy/billpov/200209/report.pdf 3 (Sept. 2002)
(advocating greater access to all institutional and retail investors through IPOs that
"would provide a broader universe of potential buyers" and "create a level playing field
to match supply and demand").
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approach includes stringent regulatory restrictions in apparent favor of
nationalistic interests; 19 this coheres with that country's emphasis on the
Dutch IPO's purported ability to advance select equitable goals.2 °
These variations in regimes have an implicit, but unexamined,
logic. Over three decades ago, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed
introduced their elegant three-tiered legal entitlements framework. 21 These
distinctions between property, liability, and inalienability rules clarify what
and when state intervention may be justified in enforcing and restricting
rights.
Undergirding these rules is a set of common considerations:
efficiency, equality, and equity. 22
This article derives from the legal entitlements framework a
schema for examining and assessing different Dutch IPO regulatory
regimes. Part I establishes this framework, which conceptualizes valuation
as a form of legal entitlement,23 but with the object being allocation of
shares rather than of rights.2 a
Specifically, IPO methods can be
differentiated on the basis of if and how they utilize a financial intermediary
to resolve informational inefficiencies and advance other considerations.
Part II examines the various international approaches to asymmetrical
valuation in Dutch IPOs as property, liability, and inalienability regulatory
regimes. 25 Specifically, the regimes in France, Israel, and Taiwan, the last
" See infra Part II.C.
20 See, e.g., Christine Hurt,

Moral Hazardand the InitialPublic Offering, 26

CARDOZO

L. REV. 711, 765 n.300 (2005) (citing Carolyn Said, Qualtrone's Trial: A Catalystfor
Change, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 2003, at 11 (describing Google's Dutch IPO as reflective
of the shift in Silicon Valley to "a new world order," and not the "favoritism and
cronyism" of 1999). See also W.R. Hambrecht + Co., OpenIPO: How It Works,

http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/index.html#

(last visited July 1,

2007) ("Shares are allocated in an equal and impartial way by the auction process.
There is no preferential allocation .... All individual and institutional investors pay the
same price per share.").
21 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). See also
generally Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A TwentyFive Year Retrospective, 106 YALE L.J. 2081 (1997) [hereinafter Symposium].
22 See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
23 This is hardly the first article to make such a connection.
See generally Saul
Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771
(1982). But while replete with applications to contract, property, and tort, the literature
appears to lack any explicit conception of how this entire framework might apply to
corporate law, and particularly to (Dutch) IPOs.
24 See infra Part I.A. This article is not concerned with the specific
components of
shares. See Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822
(1993) (distinguishing the Hohfeldian "jural relations" typology as an account of
entitlements' components from the property, liability, and inalienability rule typology
as an account of entitlements' forms) (citing Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)).
25 As with the approach of Calabresi and Melamed, this article presents merely one way
to view (Dutch IPO) legal regimes. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1090
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three bastions of Dutch IPOs, 26 are classified with the United States to elicit
their comparative regulatory costs.
This schema for viewing different IPO regulatory regimes yields a
set of valuable insights. First, the current property regulatory regime in the
United States is suitable for bookbuilding and perhaps selecting financially
disintermediated Dutch IPOs. Second, all Dutch IPOs suffer from unique
problems that militate in favor of a costly switch to a liability regulatory
regime. Finally, the analysis here of Dutch IPO regulatory regimes
demonstrates the utility of this proposed schema for evaluating a variety of
securities laws.
ii. FROM LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS TO REGULATORY REGIMES

Derived from the Coase Theorem, Calabresi and Melamed's tritiered legal entitlements framework has enjoyed widespread application.2 7

While refined significantly over time, the original framework remains a
useful way to conceptualize and evaluate different approaches to resolving
rights-based disputes. To date, however, no one has recognized the

applicability

of legal entitlement rules and their common set of

considerations to the IPO process.
This Part culls from the Calabresi and Melamed framework a tritiered schema for conceptualizing and evaluating Dutch IPO regimes.
Specifically, the different regulatory approaches to Dutch IPOs can be
organized as a sliding-scale of property, liability, and inalienability regimes.
The variations between these regimes then can be analyzed in terms of
efficiency, equality, and equity; not only are these the three ways that Dutch
IPOs are purportedly superior to bookbuilding, but they also are the very
considerations identified by Calabresi and Melamed for choosing between
different legal entitlement rules.

n.2 ("As Professor Harry Wellington is fond of saying about many discussions of law,
this article is meant to be only one of Monet's paintings of the Cathedral at Rouen.")
(emphasis in original). Cf CHARADE (Universal 1963) (Reggie Lampert: "You're
blocking my view." Peter Joshua: "Oh, which view would you prefer?" Reggie
Lampert: "The one you're blocking.") (Audrey Hepburn as Reggie Lampert, and Cary
Grant as Peter Joshua).
26 See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 21. The brief
synopsis provided here certainly does
neither justice to the original elegant contribution by Calabresi and Melamed nor the
numerous valuable refinements; the objective is merely to delineate a skeleton of the
framework for the purposes of demonstrating its applicability to and utility for sifting
through Dutch IPO regulatory regimes.

A View of the Dutch IPO Cathedral
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A. Externalities,Entitlements, and Auctions

The enforcement of legal entitlements traces back to the Problem of
Social Cost.2 8 To the extent market activity generates externalities, they are
compounded by undue social "attention on particular deficiencies in the
system" and an instinctive "belief that any measure which will remove the
deficiency is necessarily desirable. 29 Instead, when state intervention is
resituated on a sliding-scale with administrative, enforcement, and
transaction costs, the initial assignment of rights
becomes irrelevant and
30
private bargaining can produce efficient results.
Legal entitlements flow from this reasoning in reverse. Within a
State of Nature, private conflicts necessitate first-order legal decisions
about what should be a matter of power versus that of right. 3 1 According to
Calabresi and Melamed, adjudicating such decisions requires "a minimum
of state intervention,, 32 not only to compensate for harm but to protect
awards that reflect distributional judgments.3 3 This, in turn, entails secondorder legal decisions about how to confer such protection and when to
allow its voluntary exchange .
These decisions assume the form of a tri-tiered legal entitlements
schema.35
One tier comprises property rules that govern voluntary
exchanges of entitlements by private parties and thus "give[ ] rise to the
least amount of state intervention. ' '36 Another tier comprises liability rules
28See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:

The Cathedralin Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 440 (1995) ("Ronald Coase's
essay on 'The Problem of Social Cost' introduced the world to transaction costs....
And of all the law-and-economics scholarship built on Coase's insights, perhaps the
most widely known and influential contribution has been Calabresi and Melamed's
discussion of what they called 'property rules' and 'liability rules."').
29Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42-43 (1960).
30
1Id at 2-15.
31 Calabresi and Melamed make no explicit reference to the hypothetical Social
Contract, but the parallels with their example of physical mismatch are unmistakable.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and
Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235, 236 n.3 (1995)
(referencing "Calabresi and Melamed's account of the nonconsensual -or so-called

'Hobbesian'-case"). The pair, however, does make clear that they envision social
judgments and state intervention to be justified in a much broader range of disparate
relationships. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1091 n.5 ("'Bigger'
obviously does not refer simply to size, but to the sum of an individual's resources.").
32 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1090.
33Id. at

1091.

34

1d at 1092.
31Cf Morris, supra note 24, at 841 n.44 (justifying interchange of 'form of entitlement'
and 'entitlement rule' on the basis that, while "the term 'form of entitlement' more

precisely conveys the intended meaning, the use of two terms is necessitated by the fact
that.., that terminology has come into common usage").
36Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1092.
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that shift the task of valuing voluntary exchanges to a public authority.
The final tier comprises inalienability rules that establish a range of
transactions deemed impermissible by a public authority.38
The relationships between these rules are governed by multiple
considerations. Consistent with the Coase Theorem, 39 allocative efficiency
provides one class of reasons for adopting a particular rule; 40 for instance,
justification for a property or liability rule may turn on whether
4
administrative, enforcement, and transaction costs are prohibitively high. '
Wealth distribution preferences supply another class of reasons for adopting
a particular rule; 42 for instance, justification for an inalienability rule may
turn on whether endowments of certain goods are ensured.4 3 Equitable
concerns may suggest an additional class of reasons for adopting a
particular rule; 44 for instance, justification for a particular rule may turn on
idiosyncratic moral reasons not grounded in efficiency or wealth
distribution.4 5
Since its introduction over three decades ago, this legal entitlement
framework has undergone significant refinement.46 Economic analysis has

37 Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of
PropertyRules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997) (noting that the shift to a liability rule
"requires some level of state intervention in each and every transaction to set the
appropriate value for the parties") (emphasis in original).
31 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1092.
'9 Cf Ayres & Talley, supra note 31, at 706 n.9 ("Just as Coase never formally stated
the Coase Theorem in [Coase, supra note 29], Calabresi and Melamed never succinctly
stated what has been taken to be their primary normative conclusion.").
40 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1093-98.
41But see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
42 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1098-1101.
4, Id

44

at 1100.

1d. at 1102-05.
41 Id. at 1123-24. See also generally Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116
YALE L.J. 1400 (2007) (examining Calabresi and Melamed's entitlements framework
from the standpoint of moral intuitions).
46 One area disproportionately sidestepped by the derivative entitlements literature,
particularly by efficiency-based analyses, is inalienability rules. See, e.g., Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, PropertyRights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100
MICH. L. REV. 601, 602 n.2 (2001) ("This Article will focus . . . as much of the
literature has done, on alienable rights that parties may sell or waive."). But see, e.g.,
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of PropertyRights, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 931 (1985). Cf Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114
YALE L.J. 697, 703 (2005) ("It is both surprising and revealing that no commentator
appears to have considered whether bars on transfer of legal claims cohere with other
restraints on alienability."). While the specific relationship between efficiency and
inalienability is beyond the scope of this article, the framework presented here does
utilize all three types of entitlement rules to examine different Dutch IPO regimes. See
infra Part II.C.
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reevaluated legal entitlement rules in terms of transaction costs and risks.47
Options analysis has reconfigured the relationship between different rules
as well as reared new ones. 48 Corrective justice accounts have reinterpreted
legal entitlements as securing autonomy.4 9
An intriguing refinement is to view legal entitlements as a species
of auctions. Building on options analysis, Ian Ayres and Jack Balkin frame
the problem of valuing entitlements as "a classic case of asymmetric
information."50
Specifically, they contemplate a class of inefficient
transactions that result from parties maintaining private or sealed appraisals
of their legal entitlements.5 1
The classic problem, however, has a classic solution: an auction 2
According to Ayres and Balkin, disputing parties can express their

47 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 720 (1996) ("[W]hen transaction costs are

low, parties tend to bargain under liability rules as well as under property rules and may
reach outcomes superior to those reached under property rules; and when transaction
costs are high and bargaining is impossible, property rules may lead to better outcomes
than do liability rules."). See also Epstein, supra note 37, at 2095 (evaluating different
rules on the basis of which one "minimizes the sum of the costs associated with
extraction and undercompensation, the signature risks of property rules and liability
rules respectively.").
41 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995). See also
generally Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, 24 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 269
(2004); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovslky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2002); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399 (2005).
49 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALEL.J. 1335 (1986).
50 Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 706 (1996) (citing Ayres & Talley, supra note

48, at 1032-36).

51 See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 50, at 707-10.
52

There are documented instances of auctions dating back to 500 B.C. in Babylonia.

See RALPH CASSADY, JR., AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING 26-40 (1967) (providing a
comprehensive historical account of auctions) (citing HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES OF
HERODOTUS 77 (Henry Cary, trans., 1899)). But ef Martin Shubik, Auctions, Bidding,
and Markets: An HistoricalSketch, in AUCTIONS, BIDDING, AND CONTRACTING: USES
AND THEORY 33 (Richard Engelbrech-Wiggins et al., eds., 1983) ("Auctions ... have
only appeared in the comparatively civilized societies after the necessary conditions for
their existence were fulfilled .... Thus, before the seventeenth century there were few
regularly scheduled auction sales."). One of the most famous (English) auctions was
conducted by the Praetorian Guard; after the assassination of Emperor Pertinax, the
Guard sold off the entire Roman Empire in 193 A.D. and the winner, Didius Julianus,
assumed the role of Caesar for a mere two months before being overthrown and
executed. See id at 42-3. See also Klemperer, supra note 5, at 267 n.21 (dryly
observing this was "an early and sad case of the winner's curse," or a feeling of regret
for having paid more than anyone else).
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respective valuations of a legal entitlement through an "internal auction" ;53
bids submitted to a third-party serve as a basis for allocating legal
entitlement proceeds. 54 The auction thus serves as an information-forcing
device about the parties' demand functions. The nonconsensual nature of
the third-party's control over the bidding and allocation processes promises
greater stability and structure than private negotiations.
B. The Cathedralof Dutch IPO Law
This progression in reasoning about legal entitlements parallels the
evolution of the Dutch iPO's appeal in the United States. Recently, at the
request of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") formed an advisory committee composed of prominent
representatives from the academic, financial legal, and securities sectors 5
Among the committee's resultant recommendations was to explore the
viability of "auction systems, such as the Dutch auction system . . . to

5'Ayres and Balkin define an "internal" auction as a procedure in which "the proceeds
are distributed among the bidders rather than to a third party." Ayres & Balkin, supra
note 50, at 707. In contrast, an "external" auction is a procedure in which "winning
bidders pay a third party (i.e., the seller), and not each other .... Id at 712.
54Id at 712. When conducted only once, the auction involves a calculus between
property rules and what Ayres and Balkin term "first-order" liability rules. Id. at 71213; see also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 47. The auction, however, can feature
multiple rounds of bidding in which the parties take and re-take entitlements pursuant to
higher-order liability rules, with the effect that "[t]he more rounds we add ... the more
it appears to mimic bargaining between the participants." Ayres & Balkin, supra note
50, at 713. Bargaining would continue in "a theoretically endless array of sequence of
liability . .. until one side or the other retreats, its willingness to pay exhausted."
Epstein, supra note 37, at 2095.
Kaplow and Shavell have advanced rather compelling objections to this auction-based
legal entitlements scheme. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability
Rules FacilitateBargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995).
See also generally Ayres & Talley, supra note 48 (replying to Kaplow and Shavell's
objections). There are also a variety of other auction-related complications, such as the
"Winner's Curse." See, e.g., William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and
Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8, 21-22 (1961) (delineating the "Winner's
Curse" dynamic). But see generally James C. Cox & R. Mark Isaac, In Search of the
Winner's Curse, 22 ECON. INQ. 579 (1984) (contending that the "Winner's Curse"
generally occurs when bidders are not utilizing ex ante optimal strategies). The merits
of this debate are beyond the scope of this article except to the extent that that the
connection between entitlements and auctions remains sound.
51 See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMM., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A
COMM. CONVENED BY THE NYSE, INC. AND NASD AT THE REQUEST OF THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMIsSIoN A-I (May 2003), http://www.nasd.com/web/
groups/rules regs/documents/rules regs/nasdw 010373.pdf [hereinafter IPO ADVISORY
COMM.].
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collect indications of interest to help establish the final IPO price.
Indeed, during the early stages of the 1999-2000 internet bubble period, an
SEC Commissioner suggested that "[i]f the IPO frenzy continues, perhaps
the Dutch auction concept will get more IPO shares in the hands of retail
investors." 7
These comments' proximity to the bubble is hardly coincidental.
From 1999 to 2000 mean underpricing for all IPOs rose at a "hyperbolic
rate" to 63.3% and issuers left a "staggering" $62.4 billion on the table. 8
The bursting of the internet bubble only served to magnify scrutiny of
underpricing and its role within the public offering process. 59 Although
competing positive accounts exist, underpricing is best understood as a
60
species of asymmetrical information.
On the one hand, issuers may
withhold valuable information about themselves or underprice their shares

56

NASD, ANASD Approves Rules to Reform 1PO Process (Nov. 24, 2003), available at

http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?ldcService=SS GET PAGE&ssDocName =
NASDW_002817 (last visited July 1,2007).
57 Laura S. Unger, Raising Capital in Bits and Bytes (June
11, 1999),
http://ftp.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch283.htm.
The idea, however,
has been entertained for some time. See generally Katina J. Dorton, Note, Auctioning
New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REV. 1381 (1985). Indeed, France has
given its issuers the option of an auction-based IPO since 1964. See, e.g., John G.
McDonald & Bertrand C. Jacquillat, Pricing of Initial Equity Issues: The French
Sealed-Bid Auction, 47 J. Bus. 37, 37 (1974) ("In France all initial issues of common
stock since 1964 have been priced and allocated in a sealed-bid auction procedure...
."). And American corporations have been conducting stock repurchases via a Dutch
auction format since 1981. See, e.g., Anita I. Anand, Regulating Issuer Bids: The Case
of the Dutch Auction, 45 MCGILL L.J. 133, 137 (2000) ("The Dutch Auction is a

popular method of share buy-back in the United States. This popularity originated in
1981 when the first Dutch auction was completed in the U.S. by Todd Shipyards.").
" Coffee, supra note 18, at 5; Jay R. Ritter, Some FactoidsAbout the 2006 IPO Market
10 tbl. 8 (May 2, 2007), http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2006 /2OFactoids.pdf. By
reference, underpricing, or the spread between a stock's initial offering price and
closing price after the first day of trading, has averaged 17.5% and issuers have left
approximately $120 billion on the table over the past 26 years. Id. at 2 tbl. 1.
Meanwhile, during the bubble, the median age of firms going public dropped from 7.5
to 5 years, and internet firms accounted for 67 . 3 % of all IPOs. Id. at 6 tbl. 4.
59 To be sure, the internet bubble did prompt concern about abusive allocation practices
such as laddering and spinning. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing:
A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial
Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583 (2004). But this has been mitigated, in part,
by recent regulations as well as a cooling off of the public equity market and selfreformation of its practices. See, e.g., Oh, supra note 10, at 870-71.
60 See, e.g., Catherine M. Daily et al., IPO Underpricing: A Meta-Analysis
and
Research Synthesis, 27 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY & PRACTICE 271, 275-76 (2003)

(citing various competing positive accounts of IPO underpricing); Alexander
Ljungqvist, IPO Underpricing,in HANDBOOKS IN FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE
1, 2 (2004) (noting that the "best established of these [theories of
underpricing] are the asymmetric information based models.").
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to mitigate potential liability. 6' On the other hand, prospective investors
may possess imperfect information or prefer to profit from their valuations
62
via aftermarket trades.
Under this account, inaccurately priced shares are
symptomatic of informational inefficiencies.
One way to mitigate these inefficiencies is via a private
intermediary. An issuer can signal the relative quality of its offering merely
by retaining an underwriter and disclosing whether their arrangement is of
63
the firm-commitment or best-efforts variety.
Further, through meetings,
an underwriter disseminates information about an issuer to prominent
prospective
investors while collecting their reputationally-bonded
valuations and building a book of orders.64 This combination of valuable
underwriting services, however, does not come without a price.
Underwriters charge a substantial underwriting commission fee.65
Underpricing can be understood as an additional expense for insuring
against potential shareholder lawsuits and for compensating prominent,
repeat investors for their advance commitments.66

61

See, e.g., Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment Bankers

Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 344
(1989) (observing that "investors have no incentive to reveal positive information
before the stock is sold").
62See, e.g., IPO ADVISORY COMM., supra note 55, at 20 ("Roadshows have traditionally
been considered a key opportunity for large, primarily institutional, investors to gather
additional information about IPO issuers, enjoy face-to-face exposure to senior
management and learn management's view of the most important aspects of the
company and the offering .... Many large investors will not participate in IPOs unless
they are provided an opportunity to meet and evaluate management during the
roadshow."); see also Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. ECON.
187, 187 (1986) (suggesting investors may be asymmetrically well-informed about
extra-firm factors).
" See generally Craig S. Galbraith et al., Offering Prospectuses,Competitive Strategies,
and the Pricing of Initial Public Qfferings, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 31, 31-32 (2003).
There is, however, a risk of an adverse-selection problem. See, e.g., James C. Spindler,
Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Market for Underwriting
Business (July 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-564381 ("If issuers and
underwriters may have positive information about themselves that they cannot disclose
in the prospectus due to overbearing liability, they face an adverse-selection, or
'lemon,' problem in marketing the issuer's securities to investors ....");see also
generally George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Quality Uncertaintyand the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488 (1970).
64See, e.g., Daily et al., supra note 60, at 274 ("The road show is designed to gauge the
anticipated demand for the firm's stock and serves as a key input in the investment
banker's final determination of the price at which the firm's stock will initially trade.").
65See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
66See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why
Initial
Public Offerings Are Underpriced,41 UCLA L. REV. 17 (1993). See also Francesca
Cornelli et al., Investor Sentiment and Pre-IPO Markets 2 (2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-548683 ("In the literature, the exclusion of retail investors
from bookbuilding has typically been justified by arguing that retail investors are
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Intermediaries, however, are believed to be inferior to pure Dutch
IPOs in three principled respects. 6' First, Dutch IPOs should produce a
more efficient price because bids directly express market demand. 68
Second, Dutch IPOs should provide more egalitarian access because
individual and institutional investors can submit bids. 69 Finally, Dutch
IPOs should generate more equitable results because all bids at or above the
clearing price receives shares at a uniform price.7 °
These reasons track the criteria for evaluating legal entitlements.
By eliminating the need for an intermediary or a third-party source, and
thus avoiding any sort of commission or transactional premium, a Dutch
IPO theoretically should minimize the extent to which "we are in an area
where by hypothesis markets do not work perfectly [because] there are
transaction costs" and approximate the point where "market transactions or
collective fiat is most likely to bring us closer to the .. result the 'perfect'
market would reach. ' '7 1 Further, by opening bids to anyone with a
brokerage account instead of a select circle determined by the issuer, a
Dutch IPO reflects a desire "to maximize the chances that individuals will

uninformed and it is optimal to restrict the participation in bookbuilding to the
(informed) institutional investors.")
67 To an extent, this is a purely theoretical comparison since Dutch IPOs invariably
involve some kind of intermediary of either the private or public variety. See infra note
132 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., IPO ADVISORY COMM., supra note 55, at 20 (describing Dutch IPO as
a
mechanism by which "pricing and allocation are removed from the realm of issuer and
underwriter discretion .... iPOs conducted through a true auction model should not
experience the enormous aftermarket price spikes that fueled the abuses of the bubble
period.").
69 See, e.g., Shane Kite, Google Goes Dutch, Rocking IPO Sector, 17 BANK
TECH.
NEWS 27, 27 (Aug. 2004) ("Dutch auctions, say supporters, offer a truer price based on
more accurate demand of a wider market, because the issuance is open to any potential
shareholder with an Internet connection, instead of select institutional accounts favored
by individual underwriters.").
See also Hurt, supra note 20, at 769 ("If the
bookbuilding approach is eliminated, all of the abuses of that system will be eliminated
as well. The underwriter would have no ability to underprice and no ability to handpick
beneficiaries of built-in profit.").
70 See, e.g., William R. Hambrecht, Request for Comment on the Proposed
Rule
Governing Allocations and Distributions of Shares in Initial Public Qfferings,
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/strategy/bill pov/200401/wrhco2004OlO7.pdf 6 (Jan.
7, 2004) (touting the Dutch IPO as a method that "replac[es] arbitrary pricing and
preferential allocation with a system that objectively establishes the full demand curve
for an IPO and allocates to those investors willing to pay the highest price").
71Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1097. Cf generally Clifford W. Smith, Jr.,
Alternative Methods for Raising Capital, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 273 (1977) (demonstrating that
rights offerings involve significantly lower costs than financially intermediated
offerings, a result that comports with "simple finance theory [which] suggests that listed
firms should use rights offerings to raise additional equity capital").
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have at least a minimum endowment of certain particular goods ....
By
utilizing a mechanical pro rata allocation formula that awards shares
indiscriminately and uniformly, a Dutch IPO expresses "justice notions
[that] adhere to efficient and broad
distributional preferences as well as to
'' 3
1
ones.
idiosyncratic
more
other
To be sure, one glaring difference is that legal entitlements concern
the allocation of rights whereas public offerings involve the allocation of
priced shares. But in the way that liability arises from the establishment of
rights, 7 priced shares generate potential liability in the form of shareholder
remedies. For instance, sections 11 and 12 under the Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act") and Rule lOb-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Securities Exchange Act") can be understood as conferring duties
75
upon issuers and underwriters in the offering and pricing of shares.
Indeed, one well-established justification for underpricing of shares is
precisely to avoid liability.76
Another potential difference concerns whether IPOs generate
externalities of the sort that may arise from disputes over assets.
Considerable disagreement exists over the extent to which mandatory
disclosure is justified by or responsible for informational externalities. 77
There is, however, considerable consensus that IPOs do generate positive
externalities.8 And, as a practical matter, IPOs are subject to a myriad of
72 Id. at 1100.

More precisely, Calabresi and Melamed use the term "wealth

distribution preferences," which they define as "covering all the reasons, other than
efficiency, on the basis of which we might prefer to make [one party] wealthier than
[another]." Id at 1104 (emphasis in original). While they reservedly note that "the
term 'distribution' is often limited to relatively few broad reasons, like equality," id. at
1105, the egalitarian feature of Dutch IPOs thus clearly qualifies as an analogous type
of wealth distribution preference.
73Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1105.
74 But see Morris, supra note 24, at 828-29 ("The opposite of a right, in Hohfeld's
scheme is a no-right, that is the absence of a duty on the part of the other party.... The
correlative of a power, Hohfeld maintains, is liability.") (emphasis in original).
75 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How CorporationsSpeak to the
Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 951 (1991) ("10b-5 damages may represent a 'liability
rule' protecting corporate shareholders' entitlement to honest statements, but not giving
market participants property protection.").
76 See, e.g, Alexander, supra note
66.
77 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for
a

Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L.
REV. 669 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why
Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107
YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
71 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The BrandingEffect of Corporate Deal
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1600 n.68 (2006) (characterizing IPO-related
branding effects as a form of "positive externalities"). See also generally THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.12[2], at 104-05 (5th ed. 2005)
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disclosure requirements that function to protect third-party interests and
reflect social judgments.79
(Dutch) IPOs thus can inhabit the legal entitlements framework
quite comfortably. As Ayres and Balkin have demonstrated, auctions can
bridge information asymmetries in a variety of contexts. Accordingly, there
is no need to restrict this reconceptualization of property, liability, and
inalienability rules only to legal entitlements. In the way that Calabresi and
Melamed's schema can determine the extent of and justifications for state
intervention to govern legal entitlements, the schema can illuminate the role
of financial intermediaries within IPOs. Moreover, the considerations in
play for evaluating legal entitlements also apply to IPOs, and indeed exactly
so for the Dutch variety.
C. Property,Liability, and InalienabilityDutch IPO Regimes
Grafting the legal entitlements framework onto Dutch IPOs
illuminates whether and when regulatory measures may be justified.
Pursuant to the Coase Theorem, the initial presumption for Dutch IPOs is
that purely private bargaining may produce efficient results.80 Further, at
least in theory, Dutch IPOs purport to operate in a manner that exhibits
egalitarian and equitable features."
Different Dutch IPO regulatory
regimes, however, are possible to the extent that there are financial
intermediaries or trade-offs between competing considerations.
Property-based Dutch IPO regimes are characterized by a minimal
level of non-specific public intervention. Such regimes feature uniform
disclosure-based regulations that seek to ensure a minimum level of

(delineating certain non-rivalrous advantages to going public, such as generating
positive publicity). But see Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of 1PO Activity,
Pricing,and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795, 1796 (2002) ("Nonfinancial reasons, such as
increased publicity, play only a minor role for most firms" in their decision to go
public.).
79 See, e.g., Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do
They Justify
Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699 (2004) (examining comparative firm
benefits and social value as justifications for mandatory disclosure). See also Zohar
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 757-66 (2006) (asserting an alternate justification based upon
investments being a public good). Laws prohibiting insider trading also are frequently
justified on the basis of such interests and judgments, and thus could be understood as a
form of inalienability. See, e.g., Leo Katz, Harm v. Culpability: Which Should Be the
OrganizingPrinciple of the CriminalLaw?, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 217, 233
("[M]ost of the criminal law can be construed as giving individuals 'rights' in the
claim-sense . . . which is why inalienability runs so deeply through the criminal law,
and even unanimous bargains like those I described in the ... argument against insider
trading are invalid.").
80 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.

8' See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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material information for prospective investors8 2 For instance, all issuers
face common registration eligibility rules and filing requirements.8 3 These
rules and requirements apply regardless of whether an issuer chooses a
bookbuilt or Dutch IPO. 8 4 Accordingly, either method triggers certain
formal disclosure duties that are enforced via various shareholder remedies.
The choice of a specific IPO method is manifest in different
orders. 8 5 Pure Dutch IPOs can be understood as an example of a first-order
property-based regime, or an allocation and pricing process involving only
the consensual input of an issuer and prospective investors. IPOs with a
private intermediary can be understood as an example of a second-order
property-based regime or an allocation and pricing process involving
mediated consensual input from the issuer and prospective investors8 6
Included within this stratum are not only bookbuilt IPOs but also those in
which an issuer enlists an underwriter to conduct a Dutch IPO.
Different regulatory orders reflect different considerations. In their
purest form, Dutch IPOs trigger no additional method-specific
regulations. 87
On the one hand, these offerings are democratically
accessible to all prospective investors, who equitably receive a uniform
price and, in the event of an oversubscription, a proportionate allocation. 8
On the other hand, however, these offerings are susceptible to inefficient
returns, as the offering price may not reflect fully the valuations of
informed investors, who may abstain from such IPOs without an assurance
of quality or preferred treatment.8 9 The significance of attracting such
investors as well as the natural risks of an IPO often leads issuers to retain a
private financial intermediary, which triggers additional regulations.9" On
the one hand, a private intermediary not only provides its network of
82 See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.

83See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.

84 This

also includes fixed-price offerings. For an excellent analysis of fixed-price

offerings, see, e.g., Sean Griffith, The Puzzling Persistenceof the Fixed Price Qffering:
Implicit
Price
Discrimination
in
1POs
(2005),
available
at

http://ssrn.com/abstract-797865.
85 These orders within a particular regime are distinct from, but analogous to, the orders
Calabresi and Melamed identify with respect to legal entitlements. See Ayres & Balkin,
supra note 50, at 710-11 (introducing the distinction between a "first-order" and
"second-order" liability rule).

86 See, e.g., W.R. Hambrecht + Co., OpenlPO: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/faq.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008)
(reserving discretion for issuers and Hambrecht to set a final offering price different
than the clearing price determined via the OpenIPO bidding process). Cf generally
Ayres & Talley, supra note 48.
87 There are, however, different regulations that may apply by virtue of the offering
medium or size. See infra notes 110-114, 118-119, and accompanying text.
8' See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
89 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. See also infra note 195 and accompanying
text.
90See infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
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prominent investors and frequently assumes an issue's entire risk, but also
lends its reputational capital to generate efficient returns. 91 On the other
hand, the use of a private intermediary may necessitate discriminate access
or allocations.9 2
The complexities presented by an intermediated Dutch IPO have
led some jurisdictions to adopt a liability-based regime, which is
characterized by a moderate level of specific public intervention. Such
regimes feature disclosure-based regulations that seek to redress certain
method-specific problems.9 3 Specifically, the use of an auction implicates
the possibility that investors, as well as issuers, may utilize fraudulent or
manipulative bidding strategies. 94
To guard against such problems,
regulatory bodies may assume control of the price discovery and allocation
processes.
Liability-based regimes can assume a variety of forms. One class
of variations concerns the type of financial intermediary. In contrast to its
property-based counterpart, a liability-based regime utilizes either a quasipublic financial intermediary such as a stock exchange or a pure public
governmental body. 95 This shift from private to public typically reflects an
emphasis on non-efficiency considerations, such as ensuring broader access
to all kinds of prospective investors or protecting the integrity of the Dutch
IPO bidding process. Another class of variations concerns the allocation of
tasks. Some regimes may leave the responsibility for collecting and
processing bids, as well allocating shares, entirely to the issuer while
charging a financial intermediary with the publication of data and
enforcement of regulations; 96 other jurisdictions may shift this
97
responsibility, either in part or whole, to a public financial intermediary.
Again, the decision of how to mete out responsibility reflects an emphasis
on various non-efficiency considerations, such as an equitable and
transparent bidding process.
Beyond protecting the integrity of allocation and bidding, some
jurisdictions choose to have an inalienability-based regime, which is
characterized by a high level of specific public intervention. Such regimes
feature disclosure-based regulations that reflect certain unilaterallydetermined social judgments and preferences. For instance, to prevent the
outflux of control and equity to foreign investors, such regimes may impose
national quotas on the allocation and transferability of priced shares; or, to
generate confidence within the market, such regimes may institute various
types of bidding or price controls. Not surprisingly, given the coercive
9' See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
93See infra Part I.B.

94 See infra notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
9' See infra Part I.B.
96 Id.
97 id.
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nature of these judgments and preferences, the responsibility for the bidding
and allocating processes is entirely placed within the control of a
governmental entity.

IIi. IMPORTING DUTCH IPO LAW
For over four decades countries have experimented with Dutch
IPOs, and the results are quite clear. As one prominent finance scholar has
observed, "[a]round the world, auctions have fallen out of favor" with
issuers as a public offering method. 98 Of the twenty-three countries that
have permitted Dutch IPOs, five countries no longer do so and thirteen
effectively have abandoned the method. 99 Further, among the remaining
countries, Dutch IPOs are the dominant method in only one, Israel, which
did not make bookbuilding an option for issuers until
this year.1°
0
1
bookbuilding.1
to
Countries instead have increasingly turned
This Part deploys the tri-tiered schema to evaluate comparatively
the Dutch IPO regulatory regimes within four countries. The United States
exemplifies a property regulatory regime in that Dutch IPOs are subject to a
minimum amount of state intervention in the form of disclosure-based
requirements that essentially apply to all types of IPOs. Fraudulent and
manipulative bidding strategies, however, pose significant potential
external costs to certain prospective investors. Both France and Israel
exemplify a liability regulatory regime in that Dutch IPOs are subject to an
intermediate amount of state intervention in the form of centralized control
of pricing and allocation processes. Broad social interests, however, may
98

Ruth Simon & Elizabeth Weinstein, Investors Eagerly Anticipate Google's 1PO --

Dutch Auction-Type Process May Give Smaller Bidders a More Level Playing Field,
Apr. 30, 2004, WALL ST. J., at CI (quoting Alexander Ljungqvist, Associate Professor
of Finance, New York University Leonard N. Stern School of Business).
99 See Ravi Jagannathan & Ann E. Sherman, Why Do 1PO Auctions Fail?
56-7 tbl. I
(Mar. 2006) (identifying Argentina, Australia, Germany, Italy, and Sweden as no longer
permitting auction-based IPOs), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12151
[hereinafter Jagannathan & Sherman, 1PO Auctions Fail]. See also Ravi Jagannathan &
Ann Sherman, Supplement to "Why Do 1PO Auctions Fail?" (Mar. 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-892026 [hereinafter Jagannathan & Sherman, Appendix D].
This is especially notable in that underpricing appears to be an even more pervasive
problem within international equity markets. See, e.g., Craig S. Galbraith et al.,
Qifering Prospectuses, Competitive Strategies, and the Pricing of Initial Public
Offerings, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 31, 31-2 (2003) ("Within world markets the
underpricing averages tend to be somewhat higher-a result that is often explained by
differences in the perceived risk between domestic and international markets."). See
also generally Thomas J. Boulton et al., International 1PO Underpricingand Investor
Protection (2006) (finding mean first-day return of 30.5% for 4,698 IPOs in twentyfour countries from 2000-2004 examining corporate governance variables), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-928526.
100Jagannathan & Sherman, 1PO Auctions Fail, supra note 99, at 56-7.
'0'
See id at tbl. 1; see also Jagannathan & Sherman, Appendix D, supra note 99.
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conflict with the internal objectives of issuers. Taiwan exemplifies an
inalienability regulatory regime in that Dutch IPOs are subject to a high
amount of state intervention in the form of restrictive eligibility
requirements and stiff price controls for the bidding and reselling of shares.
Rather than utilizing the traditional scheme based on offering size, this Part
examines different layers of regulations according to different IPO methods
as a way to assess their relative merits.
A. UnitedStates
All efforts to raise equity publicly in the United States are subject
to the registration requirements of the Securities Act. 102 The overarching
purpose of these requirements is to "provide full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof ...
0 This disclosurebased approach is premised on an express preference to implement 10specific
4
rules that "promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.,
As a preliminary matter, the Securities Act provides broad civil and
criminal penalties for fraudulent or manipulative conduct in connection
with a purchase or sale of securities. One layer comes in the form of
section 17(a),105 the Securities Act's general antifraud provision that applies
to whatever method an issuer chooses to raise equity via a security.
Another layer comes in the form of sections 11 and 12(a)(1),
whose private
10 6
remedies also apply irrespective the offering method.
Sections 11 and 12(a)(1), however, do differentiate implicitly
between offering types. By virtue of whether registration requirements
apply to an offering, certain classes of individuals may or may not be
102

This does not include firms that arrange for financing from bank loans. Firms

seeking to avoid the registration requirements of the Securities Act, however, still must
qualify under one of its exemptions. Certain transactions also may be subject to state
blue sky laws, but they are not discussed here. Cf, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 78, § 1.0, at
3 ("[F]ederal law clearly has the most significant impact on securities regulation.").
103 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2004); see also S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1933),
reprinted in 2

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF

1933

AND SECURITIES

1934 item 17, at 1 (comp. by Jack S. Ellenberg & Ellen P. Mahar
1973) ("The basic policy is that of informing the investors of the facts concerning
securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing
protection against fraud and misrepresentation."); see also Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
EXCHANGE ACT OF

PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the

best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.").
10415 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2004) (providing that the SEC, whenever "required to determine
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
shall also
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether action will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.").
10515 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2004). Cf 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (codifying § 10(b)); 15 U.S.C. §
78j (2004) (codifying Rule 1Ob-5).
106 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2004).
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subject to liability for material misstatements or omissions. Specifically,
the express categories of section 11 potential defendants are premised on
their role in preparing or filing a registration statement. 10 7 In contrast, for
exempt or unregistered offerings, privity determines a range of individuals
and entities that may constitute an offeror or seller under section 12(a)(1). 10'
These differences comport with certain variations between offering
methods. For instance, Regulation A 10 9 and Rule 504 of Regulation D 110
afford smaller offerings an exemption from the costly registration
process.''
Issuers conducting these smaller offerings often are unable to
attract an underwriter or favorable terms from venture capitalists.1 2 One
viable method is for such issuers to conduct a direct public offering
("DPO"). 113
In terms of regulation, DPOs represent a minimalist offering
method. As a preliminary matter, this method is not subject to any specific
107See, e.g., Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, & Michael Klausner, Outside Director
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1077 (2006) (describing "a claim under section 11 of
the Securities Act" as providing "that those responsible for a registration statement
issued in connection with a public offering may be liable if there is a material
misstatement or omission in the registration statement or related documentation"). See
also Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & CoM. L.
119, 14 (2006) (observing that "[s]ection 11 of the Securities Act names the
underwriter, unlike the lawyer, as a potential defendant in a private lawsuit if a
registration statement is misleading").
'08 See, e.g., Patricia A. O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921
(1984). See also Douglas M. Branson, Collateral ParticipantLiability Under the
Securities Laws-Charting the ProperCourse, 65 OR. L. REV. 327 (1986).
10917 C.F.R. § 230.254 (providing a qualified registration exemption for offerings up to
five million dollars in a 12-month period by American and Canadian issuers); cf
generally C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and
the Casefor an UnconditionalExemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERG. Bus. L. 1 (2001).
10 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (providing a registration exemption for offerings up to one
million dollars in a 12-month period).
IH See, e.g., Jay R. Ritter, The Costs of Going Public, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 269, 272 (1987)
(presenting evidence that direct expenses average 5.3 6 % for firm commitment offerings
and 7.48% of total gross proceeds). See also C. Steven Bradford, Transaction
Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591,
603 (1996) ("In an initial public offering, these costs directly associated with the
preparation of the registration statement could total from $200,000 to $500,000.").
112 See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public Through an Internet
Direct Public
Offering: A Sensible Alternative for Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 531
(2001) ("The logic of Internet DPOs is straight forward; a company that cannot
convince an underwriter to take it public can get around this obstacle by going public
through an Internet DPO .... ").
113See generally Anita Indira Anand, The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7 J.
SMALL & EMERG. Bus. L. 433, 438-54 (2003). Direct offerings can be conducted in a
variety of ways, most commonly as a private placement or an offering to existing
security holders. The case for minimal regulation arguably applies most forcefully to
DPOs, and so other variations of direct offerings are not discussed here.
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regulations relating to registration1
Further, by marketing their own
shares to a discrete group of investors or the general public, issuers not only
eliminate the costs of a financial intermediary but also the risk of associated
liability from underwriters under section 12(a)(1).'"' And, for smaller
DPOs, issuers can avoid the financial and legal burdens associated with
registration.'16
The justifications for such limited regulation are quite clear. In
essence, DPOs comprise a contract by which an issuer directly sells shares
to prospective investors. While the contract is unilateral, the terms reflect
private negotiations based on market demand; accordingly, DPOs generate
relatively limited external risk. Moreover, in practice, DPOs tend to
implicate the rationales supporting the small offering exemptions. DPOs,
particularly those conducted online, are typically registered under
Regulation A and its $5 million cap, or the Small Company Offering
Registration and its $1 million cap;'" an offering within either cap would
be of a size for which traditional registration would be disproportionately
costly. 118
A more complex regulatory order governs financially intermediated
offerings. 119 For instance, issuers that retain an investment bank to

114

Indeed, the registration regulations do not differentiate between a direct or auction-

based public offering. DPOs have become far more feasible due to the internet, which
has introduced a new layer of regulations, but these are not specific to an issuer's
choice of method. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.504; Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7644 (SEC Feb.
25, 1999). See also Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business
CapitalBarrier?,2 J. SMALL & EMERG. Bus. L. 57 (1998).
115 See generally, Ritter, supra note 111 (presenting evidence
that firm commitment
offerings average 2 1.2 2 % and best efforts offerings average 3 1.87 % of the realized
market value of securities issued).
116 See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
7 See Stewart-Gordon Assocs., Inc., Some Points for Professional Consideration,
available at http://www.scor-report.com/professionals/proffesionals.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2008). See also Sjostrom, supra note 112, at 530-31 ("As a general rule ... no
underwriter will take a company public unless the company has, at a minimum: (1)
annual revenue of $20 million, (2) net income of $1 million, and (3) 'the potential to
achieve and sustain significant growth rates (i.e., 2 0% or greater in revenues) for the
next five to ten years.") (quoting General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman,
Comm. On Small Business, U.S. Senate, Small Business Efforts to Facilitate Equity
Capital Formation, 21-22 (2000)). From 1990 to 2000 there were a total of 4,028
DPOs (or 366.2 per a year); by comparison, during that same time period, there were a
total of 4,531 IPOs (or 411.9 per a year).
''8 See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 6339, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83.014, at 84,457 (Aug. 7, 1981) (delineating the rationales for enacting
Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D). See also Bradford, supra note 111, at 611-18
(surveying economies of scale literature for registered offerings).
119 Indeed, complex standards can transform a party into an underwriter
by virtue of its
involvement in a certain type of transaction. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(4)(D);
SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960) (finding participation in
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underwrite an offering must submit their registration statement to the
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and negotiate its
specific underwriting compensation standards.1 20
Moreover, these
underwriters are subject to not only various antifraud provisions within the
Securities Act,12 ' but also potentially elevated standards for a due diligence

defense.

122

These regulatory costs are justified by the benefits that financial
intermediaries offer. 123 In addition to substantive services an underwriting
syndicate provides its network of prominent investors, which enables
efficient price discovery and substantial advance orders.1 24 This is possible
because retaining underwriters essentially represents a lease on their
reputational capital to signal an offering's relative value to prospective
investors. 12
Moreover, as most underwriters operate on a firm
commitment basis, they assume the full risk of marketing and selling the
securities. 126
In theory and in practice, financially intermediated offerings do not
entail a specific method. By far the most dominant method, particularly for
sizable offerings, is bookbuilding.1 2 Since the internet bubble burst in
2001, however, dissatisfaction with bookbuilding and some of its adherent
distribution and registration process justified conversion of non-profit association into
an inadvertent underwriter).
120
See, e.g., NASD Rule 2710.
121See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
122See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp 643, 692-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (holding managing underwriter liable for failing to conduct independent, rather
than merely reasonable, investigation).
123The justified benefits also exceed underwriting fees, which typically range between
5
-10% of an IPO's aggregate value. See, e.g., Richard Mann et al., Starting From
Scratch: A Lawyer's Guide to Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 ARI . L. REV.
773, 839 (2004). See also Hsaun Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven-Percent
Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105 (2000) (finding underwriters invariably charge a 7%
commission for IPOs between $20 million and $80 million).
124See generally Francesca Cornelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding and Strategic
Allocation, 56 J. FIN. 2337 (2001).
125See, e.g., Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment Bankers
Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 343 (1989);
Craig S. Galbraith et al., Offering Prospectuses, Competitive Strategies,and the Pricing
of Initial Public Offerings, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 31 (2003).
126See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 66, at 68 n.190 (observing firm-commitment
underwritings "make up over 95% of IPOs"). But cf HAZEN, supra note 78, § 2.1, at 71
("The term 'firm commitment' is somewhat misleading since it is common practice to
have a 'market out' clause which excuses the underwriters from the obligation to
purchase in the event of a substantial change in the issuer's financial condition.").
127See, e.g., Hurt, supra note 20, at 733 ("In the United States, the dominant method of
distributing IPO shares is the bookbuilding method."); Ritter, supra note 58, at 14
(observing that, since their 1999 debut within the United States, auction-based IPOs
have accounted for only 1.07% of all IPOs). See also Oh, supra note 10, at 881-82 tbls.
3A, 3B.
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practices by financial intermediaries has intensified. 28 That has coincided
with the emergence of (online) auctions as a legitimate alternative for going
public. 129 Since 1999, a small but steady stream of issuers has utilized a
descending-bid,

or

Dutch,

30

auction

to

conduct

their
132
intermediaries.
financial
involved
have
they
invariably

IPOs,' 3'

and

From a regulatory standpoint, Dutch iPOs represent a hybrid
offering method. On the one hand, like DPOs, Dutch IPOs are not subject
to any specific regulations.' 33 On the other hand, like bookbuilding, Dutch
iPOs that involve financial intermediaries trigger additional compensation
and liability concerns. 134 While not integral, all of the Dutch IPOs in the
United States have utilized some form
of online bidding, which implicates
3
internet-based securities regulations.1 1
Dutch IPOs, however, do present some unique regulatory
challenges. Because pricing and allocation are a function of bidding, Dutch
iPOs are susceptible to manipulative and fraudulent practices. 136 For
instance, bidders can submit reduced orders to depress the price of shares
and then to realize their full value in the aftermarket 1 37 Similarly, bidders
can form a collusive bidding ring that intermingle phantom and sincere bids
3
to exert market-making control over allocation and pricing of shares.' 1

128

See, e.g., supra note 55 (attributing eroding public confidence in bookbuilding to

"the widespread perception that IPOs are parceled out disproportionately to a few,
favored investors, be they large institutions, powerful individuals or 'friends and
family' of the issuer"). See also generally Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing:
A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial

Public Qfferings, 69

BROOK.

L. REV. 583 (2004).

See generally Oh, supra note 10 (critically assessing the theoretical and empirical
case for auction-based IPOs).
130See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
131 See Oh, supra note 10, at 881-82 tbls. 3A,
3B.
132 See, e.g.,
Christine Hurt, Initial Public Qfferings and the Failed Promise of
Disintermediation,2 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 703, 708 (2008) ("Part of the failure of
auction IPOs is explained by the inability of the online auction to eliminate the need for
demand intermediaries generally and reputational intermediaries specifically.").
133 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
135 See supra note 114.
136 And, in the case of online Dutch IPOs, technology facilitates such strategies.
129

Prospective investors easily can identify each other to exchange bidding information
and coordinate their demand. See, e.g., Oh, supra note 10, at 906-07.
137 See generally Mira Ganor, A Proposal to Restrict Manipulative
Strategy in Auction
1POs 13 (July 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-572243; see also Bruno
Biais & Anne Marie Faugeron-Crouzet, IPO Auctions: English, Dutch ... French, and
Internet, 119 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 9, 13 (2002) ("In [the Dutch] auction, bidders can
tacitly collude by placing demand functions such that the market clearing price is very
low, and such that, any attempt to bid more aggressively, to gain market share, would
push prices too high to be attractive.").
38 See Oh, supra note 10, at 901-05.
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Perhaps most troubling is that both of these strategies are available and
attractive not only to prospective investors, but also to issuers.
Moreover, the means for combating these strategies are limited. As
a preliminary matter, fraudulent and manipulative bidding can be extremely
difficult to detect, particularly within larger auction pools. 139 There are,
however, private countermeasures, which range from an issuer exercising
opaque discretion in reviewing bids to setting reserve prices to compress
profit margins.14 0 The problem is that most such countermeasures require
implementation by the issuer, and thus fail to prevent fraud or manipulation
perpetuated on bidders. One possible solution might be to implement
public regulations to deter or redress fraud or manipulation by either
bidders or issuers. Examples of such regulations, however,
are scant,
1 41

perhaps because they do not seem to be terribly effective.

1 42
Even mandatory disclosure is a complex proposition at best.
Despite their apparent materiality, 143 Dutch IPO pricing and allocation data
presently are available on only a select basis. 44 On the one hand,
disclosing such data not only would inform prospective investors about an
IPO's quality but also guard against issuer fraud or manipulation. On the
other hand, disclosing such data would equip bidders with the capacity to

engage in collusive or fraudulent bidding.
Dutch IPOs within the U.S. thus present a gamut of tough
questions. For smaller offerings, Dutch IPOs can assume the form of a
DPO that is not subject to any method-specific regulations and eligible for a
variety of exemptions from registration. For larger offerings, Dutch IPOs
tend to approximate bookbuilding, whose use of financial intermediaries
justifies specific regulations and liability provisions. The unique auction139

See id at 903, 907.

140See id. at 905.
141See id at 904-05.

142
A separate, albeit more fundamental, question not addressed here is the efficiency of
any sort of mandatory disclosure. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of
Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION:

(Henry G. Manne & Ezra
Solomon eds., 1974); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate
Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983).
143
See generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) ("[T]o fulfill the
materiality requirement 'there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available.") (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("The general standard ofmateriality... is as
follows: An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.") Id. at 449.
144Specifically, Hambrecht releases only the initial bid range and final offering price
while issuers retain the discretion to release allocation data. W.R. Hambrecht + Co.,
OpenlPO:
How It Works, http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/
index.html# (last visited January 28, 2008). Hambrecht once published allocation data,
but no longer does so on the basis that such data are proprietary.
THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY
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based problem of fraudulent or manipulative bidding presents difficulties
for both private and public prophylactics.
B. France andIsrael

A liability approach to regulating Dutch IPOs may be gleaned from
the more mature French and Israeli regimes. Dutch IPOs have been
permitted in France since the 1960s and in Israel since 1993 Like the
United States, both countries feature a disclosure-based system. 145 But
unlike the United States, in both countries Dutch IPOs are a sufficiently
common and viable public offering method to justify a comprehensive,
specific regulatory framework.
Within France, Dutch IPOs are referred to as an Offre i prix
minimal or Mise en Vente. For this auction-based variant, the issuer utilizes
an underwriter to set an offering amount and reserve price approximately a
week before the IPO. 146 Prospective investors then submit bids for their
preferred price and quantity of shares, which are in turn used to calculate
the final offering price; oversubscribed shares result in the IPO's
postponement or allocation on a pro rata basis at a uniform price to clear
the market.1 47 When the issue debuts on the market, the underwriter
assumes the role of a price stabilizer by purchasing or selling shares. 4 8
Two regulatory bodies police and oversee France's Dutch IPOs.
The first body is the Autorit des Marchis Financiers ("AMF"), which
monitors and enforces the disclosure of material information generally; 149 a
145See,

e.g., Amir N. Licht, David's Dilemma: A Case Study of Securities Regulation

in a Small Open Market, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 673, 691 (2001) ("Israel's Securities
Law and the regulations thereunder should be similarly familiar to an American lawyer
in terms of the disclosure and anti-fraud regime they prescribe."); Marc I. Steinberg &
Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional
Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 218 (1999) ("As
in the U.S. system, regulation of public offerings of securities in France is based on
information disclosure.").
146See, e.g., Bruno Biais et al., An Optimal IPO Mechanism,
69 REv. ECON. STUD. 117,
118 (2002) (describing Mise en Vente process, in which "the firm sets a reservation
price and investors submit bids").
147 Bruno Husson & Bertrand Jacquillat, French New Issues, Underpricing
and
Alternative Methods of Distribution, in A REAPPRAISAL OF THE EFFICIENCY OF
FINANCIAL MARKETS 349, 351 (Rui M. C. Guimaraes et al., eds., 1989) (finding 20 out

of 99 Mise en Ventes from 1992 to 1998 were postponed due to excessive demand).
148See Franqois Derrien & Kent L. Womack, Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the
Control of Underpricing in Hot 1PO Markets, 16 REv. FIN. STUD. 31, 35 (2003);
Bertrand C. Jacquillat et al., French Auctions of Common Stock: New Issues, 19661974, 2 J. BANKING & FIN. 305, 307 (1978).
149The AMF was formed in August, 2003, from a triad of public entities to "improve
the coordination and efficiency of France's financial regulatory system and to raise the
French regulator's international profile." Autorit6 des Marches Financiers, Press Kit, at
3, available at http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/5152 1.pdf; see also id.
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self-described "gatekeeper,"' 5 0 AMF oversees and regulates IPOs with the
purpose of "ensur[ing] [companies] provide comprehensive and reliable
information on a timely basis and in an equitable manner to the public at
large."''
The second body is Euronext Paris,' 5 2 part of a recently formed
European integrated stock exchange that processes the daily transactions of
French stock;1 53 while not a pure governmental entity, Euronext Paris's
regulations explicitly state: "The auction process is highly structured and is
made transparent for the market since as many parties as possible
participate in this process."' 154 Euronext Paris thus adheres to policies that
reflect a clear public interest dimension.
At the same time, Euronext Paris also performs many of the
155
functions handled by private intermediaries within the United States.
Significantly, Euronext Paris actually operates all Mise en Ventes. Unlike
their United States counterparts, prospective French investors submit non-

at 3 (delineating the AMF's express purposes as being to "safeguard investments in
financial products, ensure that investors receive material information, maintain orderly
financial markets").
150Autorit6 des March6s Financiers, Annual Report 2004: Introduction to the AMF and
Overview of Operations in 2004, at 18, available at http://www.amf-france.org/
documents/general/6393 1.pdf; see also Autorit6 des March6s Financiers, supra note
149, at 3 (describing AMF as a "public entity ...justified by the policing powers it
exercises on behalf of the State," but that "[u]nlike France's other independent
administrative authorities ....the AMF is a legal person separate from the State. It can
therefore file suit ... in a civil action. As a legal person in its own right, it can levy
fees (taxes) and receive revenue directly.").
151
Autorit6 des Marches Financiers, supra note 150, at 16.
152Euronext Paris is a branch of NYSE Euronext, which was formed in September,
2000, from a merger of the Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris stock exchanges, and
subsequently acquired interests in the London International Financial Futures and
Options Exchange as well as the Lisbon stock exchange. Prior to the formation of
Euronext Paris, the Socidt des Bourses Franqaises,or France's equivalent to the SEC,
processed investors' bids and converted them into a demand curve. See, e.g., Husson &
Jacquillat, supra note 147, at 351.
153
Although Euronext's markets are integrated, they remain legally separate and subject
to their respective country's laws.

EURONEXT, EURONEXT RULE BOOK, BOOK 1, in

STOCK EXCHANGES OF THE WORLD: SELECTED RULES & REGULATIONS 39, 39 (Robert

C. Rosen ed., 2002).
154Id. at 82.
155 Indeed, Euronext Paris sees auctions, at least from a pricing and allocation
standpoint, as a substitute for private intermediaries:
The auction method does not use bid and offer prices. Instead, there
is one price at which buy and sell orders are executed ....

There is

no spread because the investors are, in a certain way, trading with
each other .... The auction method is therefore a way of avoiding
intermediaries and removing unnecessary links from the trading
chain. Ultimately, end investors trade directly with end investors.
Id. at 96 (emphasis added). But see infra note 62.
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binding bids to Euronext Paris,' 6 which in exchange provides estimated
offering prices based on the current participating pool. Euronext Paris then
sets the final offering price, which is determined by the express objective of
producing the "highest executable order volume."' 157 Finally, Euronext
Paris proceeds to execute the final orders and allocate the shares.
The comparative efficiency of the Mise en Vente is mixed. Two
prominent studies of the Mise en Vente have found first-day means that
range from 9.7% to 20.7%,158 or close to if not above the 10% percent
underpricing standard advocated for Dutch IPOs.

159

Further, these studies

compared the Mise en Vente with bookbuilding and reached split
16
conclusions about which method featured higher rates of underpricing. 0
According to the authors of one prominent French study, the Mise en Vente
experiences underpricing "very similar to those [levels] observed in the
United States in the context of the Book Building procedure.1 61 Indeed,
French issuers appear to be quite evenly split in the choice of method, with
162 Mise en Ventes and 160 bookbuilt IPOs from 1983-1998.162
Unlike France, only one public body, the Israeli Securities
Authority ("ISA"), regulates all of the country's IPOs. Akin to the SEC,
the ISA has the express objective of "protect[ing] the interests of the public

156

Id. at 69 ("Each auction shall begin with a call phase in which orders are

automatically recorded without giving rise to Transactions. During such call phase,
Members may enter new orders as well as modify or cancel existing orders.").
157 Id. at 70 ("The auction price shall be ...
the price which produces the highest
executable order volume.").
158 See Oh, supra note 10, at 893 tbl. 6A (citing Franois Derrien & Kent L. Womack,
Auctions v. Bookbuilding and the Control of Underpricing in Hot 1PO Markets, 16
REV. FIN. STUD. 31, 35 (2003); Benoit F. Leleux, Post-IPO Performance: A French
Appraisal, 14 FIN. 79, 85 (1993) (citing Bernard Belletante & Remy Paliard, Does
Knowing Who Sells Matter in IPO Pricing? The French Second Market Experience, 14
CAHIERS LYONNAIS DE RECHERCHE EN GESTION 42 (1993).
There are two other
prominent studies of the Mise en Vente, but they concern only the Second March , an
intermediary securities tier with less stringent listing requirements than the Cote
Officielle that are featured in the studies mentioned here. See Biais et al., supra note
146, at 117; Husson & Jacquillat, supra note 147, at 351. None of these studies,
however, examines the Mise en Vente's performance since France joined Euronext.
159 See, e.g., Hurt, supra note 4, at 428 (attributing to Bill Hambrecht,
founder of W.R.
Hambrecht + Co., a standard that "an auction with a first-day pop of 10% or more is a
failure"). Arguably the proper benchmark should be the commission rate. Cf Tim
Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed over Time?, 33 FIN.
MGMT. 5, 8 (2004) ("[G]iven the use of bookbuilding, the joint hypothesis that issuers
desire to maximize their proceeds and that underwriters act in the best interests of
issuers can be rejected whenever average underpricing exceeds [the standard
commission rate of] seven percent."). See also supra note 123.
160 Compare Derrien & Womack, supra note 158, at 35, with Leleux, supra
note 158, at
85.
161Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, supra note 137, at 16.
162 Oh, supra note 10, at 895 tbl. 6C.
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investing in securities."'163 Pursuant to that objective, the ISA controls the
grant of permits to publish a prospectus and regulates all stock

exchanges.164
Until this year, Israeli issuers had no choice but to go public via an
auction. 161 With or without financial intermediaries, issuers conduct their
Dutch IPO in two stages. 166 First, twenty-four hours before the prospectus
is published, shares are auctioned off to only institutional investors; in
smaller IPOs the amount of shares available at this stage is capped at 50%,
but that rises to 75% in IPOs exceeding $50 million.167 Eight days later, the
remaining shares are auctioned off to the general public.
Dutch IPOs in Israel experience only slightly more efficient results
than those in France. The most comprehensive Israeli study, which is the
only one that excludes data from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange's crash in
1994, found a mean first-day return of 12.0%.16' Notably, a significant
portion of Israeli issuers experienced negative first-day returns, with larger
IPOs resulting in greater underpricing. 6 9 These results comport with
various studies that found more informed investors made superior decisions
about when to participate and how to capitalize at the expense of their less
informed peers. 70
The French and Israeli IPO data collectively suggest two significant
insights. On the one hand, even mature Dutch IPO regimes experience
163Securities Law, 5728-1968, Ch. 2 § 2 (Isr.).
164Currently Israel has only one exchange, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The ISA is
responsible for "[e]nsuring fair and orderly trade on securities exchanges," which
entails "review[ing] proposals to amend the stock exchange's bylaws . . . approv[ing]
the stock exchange's directives and rules and amendments," as well as "supervis[ing]
trade on the exchange". Israeli Securities Authority, Functions of the ISA, available at
http://www.isa.gov.il/Default.aspx?Site-ENGLISH&ID--3,1519.
165Israeli issuers do have a choice of offering shares at a fixed-price or via an auction.
See Yakov Amihud et al., Allocations, Adverse Selection, and Cascades in IPOs:
Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 68 J. FIN. EcON. 137, 141 (2003). That
study, which examined 284 IPOs from 1989 to 1993, found that "[a]uction is by far the
preferred method as it is used in 86% of the sample's IPOs." Id.
166Until 1993, Israeli issuers had the option of announcing either a minimum price or
an acceptable price range prior to the auction. See Shmuel Hauser et al., Initial Public
Offering Discount and Competition, 49 J.L. & ECON. 331, 332 (2006). Beginning
December, 1993, issuers were no longer permitted to impose a price ceiling. Amihud et
al., supra note 165, at 141.
167Shmuel Kandel et al., The Demand for Stocks: An Analysis of IPO Auctions, 12
REV. FIN. STUD. 227, 230 (1999).
168Amihud et al., supra note 165, at 145 tbl. 2.

169See Kandel et al., supra note 167, at 245. Smaller successful bids also experienced
negative first-day returns. See, e.g., Hauser et al., supra note 166, at 341-42.
170See, e.g., Amihud et al., supra note 165, at 155 (finding relatively unsophisticated
investors could improve their performance by discerning other investors' strategies);
Hauser et al., supra note 166, at 341 (finding investors can benefit by avoiding weaker
issues and being more selectively with price). See also generally Ivo Welch, Sequential
Sales, Learning, and Cascades, 47 J. FIN. 695 (1992).
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significant underpricing, with their issuers expressing no clear preference
for an auction-based method over bookbuilding.' 7 ' On the other hand, the
assumption of an intermediary role by a quasi- or governmental public
entity in these liability
regulatory regimes does not seem to incur any real
72
efficiency cost. 1

At the same time, these public intermediaries provide greater
distributional and equitable benefits. In France, bidders enjoy superior
consistency and transparency, manifest in projected prices prior to the firstday of trading unlike the discretionary black box reserved for issuers in the
United States.1 73 In Israel, bidders enjoy guaranteed access to an IPO by
virtue of a two-stage process with allocation ceilings unlike the
indiscriminate auction process conducted in the United States. 4 In both
regimes, public collection and processing of bids would seem to be an
effective guard against the possibility of fraudulent or manipulative
bidding, particularly by issuers.
C. Taiwan

Taiwan illustrates a type of inalienability regulatory regime. As a
preliminary matter, IPOs are extremely rare in Taiwan. This is attributable
to the extremely intense scrutiny by and strict regulations from Taiwan's
central agency, the Securities Exchange Committee.' 5 For instance, unlike
the routine six-month period in the United States, issuers in Taiwan face a
compulsory lock-up period of at least two years, with constraints relaxed in
Oh, supra note 10, at 893 tbl. 6A.
e.g., id at 895 tbl. 6C.

171See, e.g.,
172 See,

173 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.

Interestingly, Euronext views

bookbuilding in very much the same way:
The main advantage of book-building is that it can be used to
influence the transparency of the allotment (where the securities
ultimately end up). This transparency is very important, particularly
when making an initial public offering. By allotting to end
investors, unilateral intervention in the market to bring the price up
to standard after a large-scale offering (price stabilization), is no
longer necessary. Another advantage of the system is that it enables
a policy of investor-oriented relations to be developed.
EURONEXT, supra note 153, at 260.
For these reasons, over the past decade,
bookbuilding has been gaining increasing popularity with French issuers and those
around the world. See, e.g., Jagannathan & Sherman, supra note 99, at 56-7 tbl. 1. The
point here is not to argue that bookbuilding is comparable or superior to auction-based
IPOs, but that intermediaries whether private or public can function to provide
greater transparency. With regards to transparency, equally if not more significant than
the choice of method is whether the pricing or allocation process is clear and consistent.
174 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
175See, e.g., Ann E. Sherman, Global Trends in 1PO Methods: Book Building vs.

Auctions

with

Endogenous

http://ssrn.com/abstract-276124.

Entry

(Dec.

2004),

available

at

644

ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW
JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:2

stages that take an additional eighteen months for insiders to liquidate their
holdings completely.' 1 6 To sidestep these onerous regulatory restrictions,
issuers reportedly raise capital by conducting private placements to existing
shareholders, who in turn resell the shares to third-parties.1'
Moreover, Taiwan imposes restrictions on the choice of IPO
method.
As with the United States, France, and Israel, auctions and
bookbuilding comprise the two most prominent methods for going public in
Taiwan.
Bookbuilding, however, is available exclusively for primary
offerings while auctions are available exclusively for secondary

offerings. 178
More significantly, Taiwan also imposes strict eligibility
requirements for bidders. First, eligible bidders are restricted to a pool
essentially consisting of Taiwanese nationals, qualified foreign institutional
investors, and certain select foreigners.1 79 Second, allocations are restricted
to no more than 6% of the total offering available to outside parties."o
Finally, the Taiwanese Stock Exchange reserves the right to suspend or
restrict trading of any securities for a firm with substantial litigation or
transactional liability or continuous rises or declines in market price. 'I1
Auction-based IPOs in Taiwan are conducted in two stages. At the
outset, the issuer announces the number of available shares, a reserve price,

176 See,

e.g., Dar-Hsin Chen et al.,
The Effect of Multiple IPO Lockup ExpirationDates

on Stock Prices: An Empirical Analysis on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (Nov. 2003)
(manuscript
at
9),
available at
http://www.fma.org/NewOrleans/Papers/
7201074.pdf. Perhaps even more fundamentally, Taiwanese law does not afford any
exemptions from registration, regardless of the offering method or size.
177 See, e.g., Yao-Min Chiang, Yiming Qian, & Ann E. Sherman,
Underpricing,
Overbidding and the Effects of Entry on IPO Auctions: Evidence from Taiwan (June
2007) (manuscript at 17 n.22), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-990929 ("We have
been told that issuers in Taiwan believe that they will receive more regulatory scrutiny
if they sell new shares in their IPO, and so it is common practice, when funds are
needed, for the company to issue more shares to existing shareholders who then sell
those shares in the IPO itself.").
178Yenshan Hsu & Chung-Wen Hung, Why Have 1PO Auctions Lost Market Share to
Fixed-Price Offers? Evidencefrom Taiwan (Aug. 2005) (manuscript at 2), available at
http://www.fma.org/Chicago/Papers/IPO methods.pdf
("Taiwan
restricts
[bookbuilding] in the way [that the method is] valid only for distributing primary
shares. However, most Taiwanese firms issue secondary shares in their IPOs, resulting
in the fact that only a few Taiwanese IPOs are distributed under the method of bookbuilding.")..
179An-Sing Chen et al., Price Support in Taiwan IPO Stock Auctions (Jan. 2005)
(manuscript at 8), available at http://www.fma.org/Chicago/Papers/PriceSupportl 3.pdf.
I80 Ji-Chai Lin et al., Why Have Auctions Been Losing Market Shares to Bookbuilding
in
1PO
Markets?
(June
2003)
(manuscript
at
8),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-410183.
181See Taiwan Stock Exchange Materials, in STOCK EXCHANGES OF THE WORLD:
SELECTED RULES & REGULATIONS Appx. C 35, 39 (Robert C. Rosen ed. 2006).

A View of the Dutch IPO Cathedral

2008]

and a four-day window for submitting bids. 182 In the first stage, only
certain preferred investors are permitted to submit bids for up to 50% of the
total issue. 18 3 Winning bids are priced on a discriminatory basis, so shares
are awarded at their submitted, rather than a uniform, price. 8 4 When this
stage has completed, the Taiwan Securities Association, a government
agency, publishes the average winning and clearing prices. l 5 The second
stage then commences, in which the general public is permitted to submit
bids for the remaining shares. 16 Winning bids are subject to a price ceiling
that is 1.3 times the reserve price.1s7 No party is allowed to purchase more
than 3% of the total IPOs shares.188
Unfortunately, additional price controls obscure any assessment of
Taiwan's auction-based IPOs. Most significantly, Taiwan imposes a 7%
limit on any daily price fluctuations, l8 9 which is in addition to the cap
imposed on the second stage of an auction-based IPO. 190 Further, the
offering price tends to be approximately 20% lower than the weighted
average of the price for winning bids. 191 The limit and price thus restrict
182

See, e.g., Lin et al., supra note 180, at 8. The reserve, or base, price is calculated by

the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) in Taiwan based on a weighted average
of four factors:
(1) the average earnings per share in the past three years multiplied
by the P/E ratio of comparable firms in the same industry (4 0 %
weight); (2) the net wealth (i.e., book equity value) per share (20%

weight); (3) the estimated dividend per share in the current year
divided by one-year deposit interest rate (20% weight); and (4) the
average dividend per share in the past three years divided by the
dividend yield of comparable firms in the same industry (20%
weight). However, the base price announced to the public may
deviate from the price set by the formula, contingent on a
satisfactory explanation to the SFC.
Id.

See, e.g.,
e.g.,
185 See, e.g.,
186 See, e.g.,
187 See, e.g.,
113

184 See,

Chen et al., supra note 176, at 8.
id
Chiang, Qian, & Sherman, supra note 177, at 15
Lin et al., supra note 180, at 8.
Chen et al., supra note 176, at 7-9. In 2000 the multiplier changed from

1.5 to 1.3. Chiang, Qian, & Sherman, supra note 177, at 16.
188See, e.g., Lin et al., supra note 180, at 8 ("Under the bidding rules, no bidder shall be
allowed to win more than three percent of the IPO shares (or six percent of the shares
designated for auction). This feature encourages more bidders to participate and
compete in auctions.").

189 See, e.g., Anlin Chen, Sue L. Choiu, and Chinshun Wu, The Effect of IPO
Characteristics on Long-Run Performance of Taiwan's IPOs: Evidence from
Efficiently Learning Markets, in INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 29, 30 (Greg N. Gregoriou ed. 2006) ("Stocks traded in Taiwan are
confined within price limits. The range of such limits is calculated based on the
preceding day's closing price. Most of the time the range is within 7% above and 7 %

below the preceding closing price.").

190See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
'9' See, e.g., Lin et al., supra note 180, at 14.
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the possible amount of underpricing, while the depressed offering price
tends to encourage some degree of underpricing. 19 2 According to one
study, when first-day returns are measured against a market index, the
variation is a positive 21.1%, 193 which suggests that the lower offering price
tends to outweigh the limit and cap.
Taiwanese regulations, however, do seem to have certain
distributional and equitable benefits. The severe allocation limits on bids
has had the apparent effect of diminishing the presence of institutional
investors.
Unlike the 70% international average for bookbuilt IPOs,
Taiwanese IPOs average merely 19% institutional allocation. 194 To an
extent, this is attributable to specific procedural features of Taiwan's Dutch
IPOs. Like France and Israel, Taiwan publishes certain pricing data, such
as the clearing and reserve prices from earlier auction rounds. However,
Taiwan also publishes the allocation, bidding price, and total dollar amount
for each winner in the institutional round, which provides retail investors an
advantage in fraudulent or manipulative bidding.1 95
As a 196
result,
institutional investors have less incentive to participate in these IPOs.
This effect seems to comport with Taiwan's distributional and
equitable goals. The disincentive for institutional investors to submit bids
essentially widens the door for retail investors. Because of the strict
eligibility requirements, most of these retail investors appear to be
Taiwanese nationals. Taiwan's Dutch IPO regulations thus express a
preference to minimize foreign ownership, even at the expense of foregoing
valuable sources of equity.

192 Nevertheless,

according to one study, "[e]ven though the price limits prohibit the

stock prices to reflect their fair prices, ...[an Efficient Learning Market] still holds
even under price limits." Chen, Choiu, and Wu, supra note 189, at 30 (citing Anlin
Chen, Sue L. Chiou, and Chinshun Wu, Efficient Learning Under Price Limits:
Evidence from 1POs in Taiwan, 85 ECON. LETTERS 373 (2004)). See also generally
Yong H. Kim & J. Jimmy Yang, The Effect of Price Limits: Initial Public Qfferings vs.
Seasoned
Equities
(Oct.
2004),
available
at
http://www.fma.org/NewOrleans/Papers/7202015.pdf.
193 Chiang, Qian, & Sherman, supra note 177, at 16.
194 Lin et al., supra note 180, at 5.
195 Gwohorng Liaw, Yu-Jane Liu & K.C. John Wei, On the Demand Elasticity of initial
Public Qfterings: An Analysis of DiscriminatoryAuctions (July 2000) (manuscript at
5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-241905 ("[T]he underwriters in Taiwan also
announced the information on the bidding price, quantity and total dollar amount for
each winner. This means that the public can also estimate the demand elasticity based
on the winning bid schedules."). But see Lin et al., supra note 180, at 4 (finding that
"institutional investors are collectively better informed than retail investors" and that
"[c]onsequently, retail investors are more likely to overbid and suffer a winner's curse,
or underbid and lose the opportunity in winning shares in hot IPOs").
196 See id at 30 (finding that, although there was no actual Winner's Curse, there is
nevertheless "an incentive [for informed investors] to shade their demand").
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IV. CONCLUSION
Let us now track back to the United States' property Dutch IPO
regulatory regime. For a variety of reasons, importing an inalienability IPO
regime such as Taiwan's is a remote proposition. Certainly any sort of
attempt to restrict foreign equity from the United States would be met with
substantial resistance. Further, the significant role of institutional investors
in IPOs here makes any sort of allocation or pricing caps highly unlikely.
A system of differential pricing might seem not only suspicious to retail
investors, but also antithetical to the Dutch IPO's appeal as an egalitarian
method.
Far more instructive are the liability Dutch IPO regulatory regimes
of France and Israel. Both countries charge a quasi- or fully public
intermediary with the responsibility of collecting, processing, and allocating
bids. This type of intervention does not appear to incur a substantial
efficiency cost, either absolutely or relative to the levels experienced by
Dutch IPOs in the United States. In France, a regulatory body utilizes a
straightforward formula to generate estimated offering prices that provide
bidders with a reliable and transparent view of IPOs; and in Israel, the
sequencing of an institutional bidding round followed by a retail bidding
round ensures diverse and equitable access to IPOs. Finally, while there is
no concrete evidence from either country, the insertion of a quasi- or fully
public intermediary would seem to complicate the ability of issuers to
engage in fraudulent or manipulative bidding.
Importing these liability-based benefits into the United States,
however, seems imprudent. Instead of allowing a private intermediary,
such as Hambrecht, to regulate the allocation and bidding process, that
control would be shifted to either the SEC or one of the stock exchanges.
While a remarkable agency in many respects, the SEC arguably has been
most effective as an independent regulatory body, and not one that is
actively engaged in the mechanics of the public offering process.
Moreover, inserting the SEC into the Dutch IPO process potentially could
drive issuers to opt for bookbuilding or some alternative process, as has
been the case in Taiwan, due to the costs and inconvenience of public
regulation. To be sure, none of this is worth contemplating seriously until,
or if, the Dutch IPO emerges as a prominent competing method.
As a result, we are left with the somewhat surprising conclusion
that not all intermediaries are alike within the Cathedral of Dutch IPO Law.
From an efficiency standpoint, Dutch IPOs have failed to distinguish
themselves from bookbuilding. Accordingly, the strongest case for Dutch
IPOs must present concrete distributional and equitable considerations to be
truly justified. To do so, private Dutch IPO intermediaries should disclose
more information about their bidding processes, specifically the prices and
quantities submitted by institutional and retail investors. And private Dutch
IPO intermediaries should provide greater transparency about their pricing
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processes, specifically the reasons why issuers choose to depart from a
clearing price supposedly determined by bids. Only then can we begin to
assess fully how Dutch iPOs should be regarded within our property Dutch
IPO regulatory regime.

